The use of auxiliary hypotheses to integrate epigenetic inheritance into neo-Darwinism [closed]

Darwinism emerged powerfully in the 19th century in stark contrast to Lamarckism. According to Popperian epistemology, Darwinism has withstood any attempt at refutation; it has been extensively corroborated. This leads us to affirm that its truth value is almost absolute, even though, according to Popper, we are not in a position to state the absolute truth of any theory; we can only corroborate it to a greater degree, as is the case with Darwinism. At the same time, growing advances in the field of epigenetics suggest that Lamarck was also right by identifying mechanisms that allow the transgenerational transmission of phenotypic traits induced by the environment. This retrospectively validates the Lamarckian premise of the inheritance of acquired characters, calling into question the exclusivity of random genetic mutation as the sole evolutionary driver within neo-Darwinism. When contemporary evolutionary theory attempts to absorb these environmental modifications , it often introduces intermediate auxiliary hypotheses. My question is about epistemology: Does the use of auxiliary hypotheses, to integrate epigenetic inheritance into neo-Darwinism, constitute a legitimate defense mechanism, or does it represent a symptom of theoretical degeneration?