Artificial intelligence, epistemic authority, and emerging risks in veterinary clinical decision-making

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly visible in veterinary medicine, not only in diagnostic and decision-support applications but also in ways that may influence how clinical reasoning is structured. Because veterinary clinical decision-making is shaped by animal welfare, owner preferences, economic constraints, and legal ambiguity, AI should be evaluated not only in terms of performance, but also in relation to epistemic authority and professional judgment. This article is a theoretical narrative review based on targeted searches in PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar. The literature was examined conceptually with particular attention to clinical decision-making, explainability, automation bias, epistemic authority, and veterinary ethics. This review identifies two theoretically plausible areas of risk that may arise under certain conditions and require empirical testing in veterinary clinical settings. The first is potential authority delegation, in which AI outputs may gradually become de facto reference points that guide clinicians’ reasoning and narrow the space for independent judgment. The second is potential epistemic-normative reshaping, whereby AI may indirectly influence the informational, evaluative, and justificatory framework of clinical decisions, particularly in legally uncertain and ethically contested areas such as euthanasia, off-label use, and unlicensed treatments. In veterinary medicine, the central question is not only whether AI is accurate, but what kind of position it occupies within clinical reasoning. Given these potential risks, AI should be treated as a bounded and critically reviewable support tool rather than as an epistemic authority.